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## OFERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD Washington 25, D. C.

March 4, 1954

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD ASSISTANTS

SUBJECT: Relation of NSC 166/1 (Communist China) to other OCB Working Groups Concerned with the Far East

NSC REVIEWED 6/13/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND

The attached schematic relationship of NSC 166/1 to other NSC FE papers has been prepared in reference to discussion at the Assistants' meeting of February 19, particularly to General Porter's memo and diagram.

The attached table indicates where individual working group responsibility already exists, by reason of the inclusion in assigned (or prospective) NSC papers of language either identical or similar to that of NSC 166/1. It also shows where other aspects of NSC 166/1 might be considered applicable, so that recognition of their relevance by the working group concerned will assist in the coordinated implementation of the basic policy paper on Communist China.

Five aspects of implementation extend beyond the Far East area:

- 1. The maintenance of the security of the off-shore island chain (para. 5a.) is intimately related to the Alaska-Aleutians sector of continental defense (NSC 5408); this however is primarily a Defense responsibility, not assigned to OCB;
- 2. In view of the common borders of China with South Asian countries, the prevention of Chinese Communist aggression elsewhere (para. 3b.) involves that area;
- 3. The requirement in para. 5e. for selection of non-communist Asien countries other than Japan for development applies to all Asian countries;
- 4. The world-wide aspects of para. 5g., pressures on Communist China, and para. 5i., impairment of Sino-Soviet relations are evident; they are not confined to the Far East;
- 5. Para. 5j., conviction of the soundness of US policy toward Communist China, is also world-wide.

In addition to the complexities illustrated by the foregoing and by the attached diagram, it should be noted that the subparagraphs referred to are not "courses of action" in the usual NSC paper sense, but are instead "policy conclusions". This terminology indicates a manner of handling somewhat different than the specific operational activity required

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in the more common case. This is an important factor in the following conclusions, set forth for discussion:

- Where there is identical or similar language in an assigned NSC paper, no further reference to NSC 166/1 is needed;
- 2. Where NSC 166/1 has provisions supplementary to those of a given NSC paper, the OCB working group (or individual agency) concerned should be notified by the responsible OCB staff representative; actions relating to such provisions should be reported back through the OCB staff representative;
- 3. The OCB staff should draft a brief over-all report on NSC 166/1 which would indicate where further details will be found in the reports on other NSC policy statements and actions.

Elmer B. Staats Executive Officer

Attachment: Table - Existing and Prospective OCB Working Groups Concerned with the Far East (TOP SECRET)

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